Monday, October 5, 2020

M/S Frontier Green Wood Industries (Pvt) Ltd; Vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Withholding Zone), RTO, Peshawar

 APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, SPECIAL BENCH, PESHAWAR

 STA No.102/PB/2014

(Tax period Feb, 2013 to Nov, 2013)

STA No.40/PB/2015

(Tax period Dec, 2013 to Sep, 2014)


M/S Frontier Green Wood Industries (Pvt) Ltd; House No.22, University Town, Old Jamrud Road, Peshawar.

 

Appellant

 

Vs

 

The Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Withholding Zone), RTO, Peshawar.

 

Respondent

 

 

 

 

Appellant by:

 

Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate

Respondent by:

 

Mr. Ashfaq Masood  &

Mr. Muhammad Younis Khan, DRs

 

 

 

Date of hearing

 

05.10.2020

Date of order

 

05.10.2020


O R D E R
RDER

M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member):  The titled appeals have been filed by the Appellant/registered person against Order-in-Appeal Nos.278/2014 dated 28.10.2014 and 392/2015 dated 27.04.2015 passed by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Peshawar in respect of tax periods February, 2013 to November, 2013 and December, 2013 to September, 2014 respectively on the grounds as set forth in the memo of appeals. The facts of the case and the issue involved in the instant appeals are the same and identical, therefore, both the appeals are being disposed of through this order.

2.       The precise facts culled out from the record are that the Appellant registered persons filed its sales tax returns for the tax periods under consideration but did not deduct/withhold the sales tax as per rule 2 of Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007 notified vide SRO 505(I)/2007 dated 30.06.2007 and subsequently amended through SRO 98(I)/2013 dated 14.02.2013 and SRO 505(I)/2013 dated 13.06.2013 at the time of making payment to the recipients. On the basis of the aforesaid default, a show cause notice under section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (“the Act”) was issued by the Assessing Officer. In response thereto, the registered person submitted that the raw wood purchase in from of standing trees being agricultural produce is exempt from the levy of sales tax. The Assessing Officer did not accept the plea of the registered person and levied sales tax as well as default surcharge and penalty. Felt aggrieved, the Appellant registered person preferred the appeals before the learned CIR(A) who vide orders dated 28.10.2014 and 27.04.2015 confirmed the treatment accorded by the Assessing Officer. Being aggrieved of the said orders, the appellant has filed the appeals before this Tribunal and assailed the orders on a number of grounds.  

3.       The aforesaid appeals of the Appellant were earlier heard and disposed of by this Tribunal vide order dated 14.05.2015 by the decision of the majority Members in favour of the registered person. The Respondent Department went to choose the reference application under section 47 of the Act before the Hon’ble Peshawar High Court. The Hon’ble High Court through a common judgment dated 07.11.2019 disposed of the matter in favour of the Department by observing in paras 12 to 14 of the judgment which reads as under;-

“12. It may not lose the sight of the Court the word “wood” has not been specifically mentioned in entry No.10 of table-2 of the 6th Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to be exempted from the sales tax being agricultural produce. In the light of the above discussion, in our view, the majority of Members have fallen into error by observing, the wood used by the respondents for the manufacturing of chipboard, has not lost its character as wood (agricultural produce). Informing the same opinion, they mainly put the example of tobacco used for manufacturing of cigarettes. It may not be forgotten, tobacco, after going through the manufacturing process, despite acquiring the shape of cigarette, does not lose its original character as tobacco. While such was not the case, in the use of wood for the manufacturing of chipboard, as it after going through the manufacturing process, not only changed its character but no way could be used as wood in its original form. 

13.     In the light of the above discussion, we resettle the answer to the questions raised herein, which have already been answered by the decision of the Minority i.e Accountant Member of the learned Tribunal, by observed the wood used in the manufacturing process of chipboard has lost his character as agricultural produce. Therefore, the respondent was liable to recover the sales tax from the persons who had sold the same to them as per the mandate of the above quoted provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. 

14.     Accordingly, the instant Reference and the connected References are answered affirmative. The office is directed to send the copy of this judgment under the seal of this Court to learned Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar Bench for the disposal of appeals in the light of the above observations which shall be deemed pending before it for their disposal.” 

4.       Against the above order of the Hon’ble Peshawar High Court, the Appellant registered person went to file the appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan whereby their Lordships while deciding the appeals vide order dated 25.06.2020 sent the matter again before this Tribunal with the following observations:-

3. Today they were heard with respect to section 13 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with item No.13 onwards of Table-I in items 10 onwards of the Table-2 to the 6th Schedule. The department urges that, under the referred provisions, the wood does not fall within the exempted category of the Sales Tax regime being not an agricultural produce. This aspect of the matter was also not attended to by the Tribunal. Therefore, in view of the observation, as noted above, the learned Tribunal shall also consider this aspect of the matter. However, the opinion, as expressed by the learned High Court or the forum below, maybe treated by the learned Tribunal as tentative in nature. Since that this matter pertains to the year 2015, it is expected that the same will receive due attention by the learned Tribunal and will preferably be decided within a period not more than two months. Needless to say, any parties, if aggrieved will be at liberty to avail the remedy in accordance with the law.” 

5.       In, compliance with the aforesaid order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the titled case came up for hearing before this Bench on 05.10.2020. The learned AR for the Appellant at the very outset without touching upon the merits of the case contended that the show cause notice and in consequence thereof the order passed by the Assessing Officer suffered from serious legal and jurisdictional infirmities/flaws that go to the root of the case and must be considered and settled first. He submits that the Assessing Officer lacks the powers/jurisdiction which he erroneously exercised in passing the original assessment order under section 11(2) of the Act. He explains that provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 are applicable only in case of a person who has not paid tax due on his supplies made by him or has made short payment or has claimed input tax credit or refund which was not admissible under this Act. Default of withholding tax cannot come within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 11 ibid, thus according to him, the demand created by the Assessing Officer is unsustainable in law. He states that if non-deduction/ withholding of tax on purchases comes within the ambit of “short payment of tax” then there was no need to insert sub-section (4A) in section 11 of the Act. The said sub-section was inserted through Finance Act, 2016 having no retrospective effect and therefore, not applicable for the tax period prior to June, 2016. Reliance is placed on 2019 PTD 561. He, therefore, pleaded that the appeal be accepted on this score alone. 

6.       On the other hand, the learned DR has strongly opposed the contentions made by the learned Counsel for the registered person and supported the order passed by the lower authorities. Learned DR has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Lahore High Court titled as M/s. Punjab Beverages Company (Pvt) Ltd. Vs. Federation of Pakistan wherein it was held that non-deduction/withholding of tax on purchases is in fact a short payment of sales tax and therefore, squarely covers within the ambit of section 11(2) of the Act. He, therefore, submits that that the impugned order passed by the learned CIR(A) is legal, lawful, and within the framework of the law. In rebuttal, the learned AR for the Appellant submits that the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble High Court was suspended in ICA No.1118/2016 vide order dated 01.08.2016 and the matter is still pending.  

7.       We have heard the parties and perused the record. The submissions made by the learned AR for the Appellant have substance on the point of legal issues. However, before dilating upon the legal issues raised by the learned AR for the Appellant, it is necessary for us to first comply with the order dated 25.06.2020 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the question arises as to “whether the “wood” used by the appellant for manufacturing of its goods fall within the ambit of Entry No.10 of Table-2 of 6th Schedule to the Act?” Before forming our opinion on the issue, it is expedient to first repopulate the precise facts and the relevant law hereunder:-

Facts  

The brief facts are that the Appellant purchased the raw wood from the market for manufacturing of its goods but did not withhold and deposit the sales tax on purchase thereof. The Assessing Officer issued the show cause notice to the Appellant for such default. In response, the Appellant took the plea that the raw wood is exempt from the levy of sales tax in terms of Entry No.10 of Table-II of 6th Schedule to the Act. The Assessing Officer did not accept this plea of the Appellant and pass the order against them.

Relevant Law 

Entry No.10 of Table-II is reproduced as under:- 

Serial No.

Description

Heading Nos. of the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969)

10.

Agricultural produce of Pakistan, not subjected to any further process of manufacture. (Emphasis supplied)

Respective headings

 

                 “Section 2(16):-Manufacture or produce includes

(a)      any process in which an article singly or in combination with other articles, materials, components, is either converted into another distinct article or product or is so changed, transformed, or reshaped that it becomes capable of being put to use differently or distinctly and includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product;

(b)      process of printing, publishing, lithography, and engraving; and

(c)      process and operations of assembling, mixing, cutting, diluting, bottling, packaging, repacking or preparation of goods in any other manner.”

Opinion 

It can be seen from the above Entry No.10, it is clearly mentioned therein that agricultural produce which is not subject to further manufacturing shall be exempt from tax so it gives a general exemption to agriculture produce of Pakistan provided they are not subject to any further process of manufacture. It is also to be noted that Sixth Schedule to the Act comprises of the following three Tables:-

1.     Table-1 (Imports or Supplies)

2.     Table-II (Local Supplies only)

3.     Table-III (Supplies with conditional exemptions)

Sixth Schedule Table-I also mentions some other agriculture products as exempt but without imposing any condition of not subject to any further process of manufacture meaning thereby that the following products whether imported or locally supplied, whether or not taken through the manufacturing process will be exempt from the levy of sales tax. These are as under:-

13.     Edible vegetables including roots and tubers, (except ware potato and onions), whether fresh, frozen, or otherwise preserved (e.g. in cold storage) but excluding those bottled or canned.

14.     Pulses.

15.     Edible fruits excluding imported fruits (except fruits imported from Afghanistan) whether fresh, frozen, or otherwise preserved but excluding those bottled or canned. 

16.     Red chilies excluding those sold in retail packing bearing brand names and trademarks.

17.     Ginger excluding those sold in retail packing bearing brand names and trademarks. 

18.     Turmeric excluding those sold in retail packing bearing brand names and trademarks.

19.     Cereals and products of milling industry, excluding the products of milling industry other than wheat and meslin flour, as sold in retail packing bearing brand name of a trademark.

20.     Seeds, fruit, and spores of a kind used for sowing.

21.     Cinchona bark.

22.     Sugar beet.

23.     Sugar cane.  

It is evident from the above list that the legislature has deliberately not placed the condition of “not subject to any further process of manufacture” upon these products. To further distinguish the situation foreseen under Tables I & II, it will be interesting to note that cereals though taken through the process of milling yet these have been given exemption.

Further products other than those mentioned in Table-I will have to be seen through the prism of Entry No.10 of Table-II of Sixth Schedule which places the condition “not subject to any further process of manufacture” as specified in Entry 10 of Table II to Sixth Schedule. In the instant case wood has not been purchased as standing trees from the farmers but as cut logs and scrap from middlemen. By cutting the trees and reducing them to the specified size of logs for easy handling and transportation the trees have been taken through a process of manufacture as cutting has been included in the definition of manufacturing as defined in section 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. It can be seen from a plain reading of section 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 cutting is a process of manufacturing. Reliance may be placed in the case titled Malik Shamas Din & Brothers Vs The Income Tax and Sales Tax Officer and other, (1959 PTD 718), in this case, the petitioner claims that he is a timber merchant and his business is to take forests on a lease, fell down the trees, cut the trees into pieces for selling it in the market. Therefore, he claims that his activities do not fall within the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 and, therefore, the Sales tax authorities have no justification to assess their sales of timber to sales tax under the Sales Tax Act of 1951. The Hon’ble Lahore High Court was held that fell down trees, cut off the branches, remove the leaves and cut the wood into pieces and to sell those pieces in the markets is covered under the definition of "manufacture" and it is, therefore, obvious that the process to which a person resort to make the trees marketable by turning it into what is called timber is a process of manufacture for the purpose of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. Therefore, the Hon’ble Court held that the same is liable to sales tax.

Accordingly, we hold that wood purchased by the Appellant for use in further manufacturing has already been through a process of manufacturing and hence does not qualify for exemption under Entry 10 of Table-II of Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

8.       Now we come to the following legal questions that emerge from the records which are required to be considered and dilated upon by this Tribunal while deciding the instant appeal:-

i).       Whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provision of sub-section (4A) of section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 inserted through Finance Act, 2016 having a retrospective effect and is applicable for the tax periods February, 2013 to September, 2014? 

ii).      Whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provision of sub-section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was relevant and the case of the Appellant falls under the said provision? 

In order to appreciate the divergent views of the parties, it would be appropriate to first examine and review the relevant provisions of section 11(2) of the Act which reads as under:-

Section 11(2). Where a person has not paid the tax due to supplies made by him or has made short payment or has claimed input tax credit or refund which is not admissible under this Act for reasons other than those specified in sub-section (1), an officer of Inland Revenue shall after a notice to show cause to such person, made an order for assessment of tax actually payable by that person or determine the amount of tax credit or tax refund which he has unlawfully claimed and shall impose a penalty and charge default surcharge in accordance with section 33 and 34.” 

A careful reading of the provisions of section 11(2) of the Act, as reproduced above, inter alia, mandates that:- 

i.                 Where a person has not paid the tax due on supplies made by him. Or

ii.                Where a person has made a short payment on supplies or

iii.              Where a person has claimed input tax credit or refund which is not admissible under this Act. 

The Officer of Inland Revenue after a notice to show cause to such person, made an order for assessment of tax actually payable by that person.   

9.       Subsequently, through Finance Act, 2016 certain amendments were made in the Act, and sub-section (4A) of section 11 of the Act was inserted which read as under:-

(4A). Where any person, required to withhold sales tax under the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, fails to withhold the tax or withholds the same but fails to deposit the same in the prescribed manner, an officer of Inland Revenue shall after a notice to such person to show cause, determine the amount in default.” 

It can be seen from the plain reading of the above provisions of law that after insertion of sub-section (4A) through Finance Act, 2016, the person who has been required to withhold sales tax under the provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder fails to withholds the same or fails to deposit the same shall be charged to tax after issuance of show cause notice, determine the amount in default. It is quite significant to note that prior to the said amendment, there was no provision in the Act that declared a person in default if such person fails to withhold sales tax or fails to deposit the same in the Government treasury. 

10.     Now we come to question No. (i) as to whether the provision of sub-section (4A) of section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 inserted through Finance Act, 2016 having a retrospective effect and is applicable for the tax periods February, 2013 to September, 2014? The Assessing Officer vide orders dated 27.06.2014 and 24.03.2015 passed under section 11(2) of the Act observed that the appellant did not deduct/withhold the tax while making payments to the recipient therefore, it is liable to pay the tax as determined in the said orders. The crucial point of divergence between the parties is the applicability of section 11(4A) inserted through the Finance Act, 2016, and in simple terms, the contest is as to whether the same would apply to the case of the appellant for the tax period which relates to the period commencing from February, 2013 to September, 2014 or otherwise?

11.     It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that the applicability of enactment can best be adjudged from its expressed content and implied intent. When the enactment itself provides for the same to have effect from a particular point in time, the express command of the legislature is to be abided, interpreted, and applied accordingly. In the present case, the Finance Act, 2016 provides:

"1. Short title, extent and commencement:- (1) This Act may be called the Finance Act, 2016.

(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.

(3) It shall come into force on and from the first day of July, 2016, except the following provisions thereof which shall come into force on the next day following the assent of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan given to this Act, namely……………….."(Emphasis supplied) 

Sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Finance Act, 2016, highlighted above, clearly and expressly provides for its provisions to take effect from 1st July 2016. This being so, there can be no cavil to its applicability commencing from 1st July 2016 and not for any period prior thereto.

12.     With regards to the contention of the learned DR that the amendments related to the procedure, and would thus have retrospective effect on the case of the Appellant, we are afraid this line of argument, though attractive, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Like any other fiscal enactment, the Act provides for three distinct types of provisions. The charging provisions, which relate to the levy or charge of the tax, which usually state that tax is to be levied and on what matters, or goods or income and in which manner and at what rate and matters relevant thereto. The assessment provisions, which deal with the assessment, calculation, or quantification of the tax for the purposes of determining the amount of tax due and payable or which has escaped collection or has been under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate or on which excessive relief or refund has been allowed. The collection provisions, which relate to the mode and manner of receipt or collection of the tax. The charging sections have to be strictly construed and any benefit found therein has to be given to the taxpayer. However, the assessment and collection provisions are merely the machinery sections and they can be liberally construed. The aforesaid categorization of provisions of fiscal statutes has been very aptly explained in detail by His Lordship Mr. Justice. Rustam S. Sidhwa, in M/s Friends Sons and Partnership Concern v. The Deputy Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore and others (PLD 1989 Lahore 337).

13.     Now, to the crucial issue of applicability of amendments introduced in fiscal statutes. It was in 1905, when Lord Macnaghten, in The Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (1905 AC 369) case, speaking for the Privy Council, opined that:

"As regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question is a matter of procedure only, the petition is well-founded. On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case, there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested."

The above principle of interpretation of statutes was followed and further developed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Some of the leading cases are Muhammad Ishaq v. State (PLD 1956 SC 256), Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Lyallpur (PLD 1963 SC 322), The State v. Muhammad Jamel (PLD 1965 SC 681) and Abdul Rehman v. Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1966 SC 362). It was the case of Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187) that the said principle was articulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in terms that:

"Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that if in this case process any existing rights are affected or the giving of retroactive operation cause inconvenience or injustice, then the Courts will not even in the case of a procedural statute, favour an interpretation giving retrospective effect to the statute. On the other hand, if the new procedural statute is of such a character that its retroactive application will tend to promote justice without any consequential embarrassment or detriment to any of the parties concerned, the Courts would favourably incline towards giving effect to such procedural statutes retroactively." 

The opinion of the Apex Court, rendered in the above referred cases, has remained un-wavered, as can clearly be seen from decisions that followed, in particular Ch. Safdar Ali v. Malik Ikram Elahi and another (1969 SCMR 166), Muhammad Abdullah v. Imdad Ali (1972 SCMR 173), Bashir v. Wazir Ali (1987 SCMR 978), Mst. Nighat Yasmin v. National Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 391), Yusuf Ali Khan v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Karachi (1994 SCMR 1007), Malik Gul Hasan & Co. and 5 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 237) and Commissioner of Income Tax, Peshawar v. Islamic Investment Bank Ltd. (2016 SCMR 816). In the more recent case of Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I v. Eden Builders Limited (2018 SCMR 991), where the question was whether or not the provisions of section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, being procedural in nature, would have retrospective effect, and whether pursuant to the amendment brought about in section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2009 consequential extension in date of expiry of the limitation period would operate prospectively or otherwise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that prospective applicability:

"……….. was not permissible as certain rights had already come to vest in the respondents on the date on which they had filed their tax returns under the original section…..." 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court also went on to reiterate the view taken earlier in the Nagina Silk Mill case (supra):

"The Courts must lean against giving a statute retrospective operation on the presumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust. It is chiefly where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality of past transactions, or impair existing contracts, that the rule in question prevails ... Even if two interpretations are equally possible, the one that saves vested rights would be adopted in the interest of justice, especially where we are dealing with a taxing statute." 

Thus, the judicial consensus, as it stands today, are that firstly, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise, charging provisions are to be applied prospectively. Secondly, the assessment and recovery provisions are to be considered retrospectively unless the enactment expressly or impliedly provides otherwise.

14.     When we revisit the provisions contained in section 11(2) of the Act and particular sub-section (4A) of section 11 of the Act in the light of the above discussed settled principles of interpretation, it prima facie established that section 11(2) mandates that where a person has not paid the tax due on supplies or has made a short payment on or has claimed input tax credit or refund which is not admissible under this Act, the Officer of Inland Revenue shall after notice to show cause to such person, made an order for assessment of tax actually payable by that person. While sub-section (4A) of section 11 ibid specifically provides that a person who has been required to withhold sales tax under the provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder fails to withholds the same or fails to deposit the same shall be charged to tax after issuance of show cause notice, determine the amount of tax in default. In the case in hand, the amendment had enhanced the appellant’s tax liability which in fact was the liability of the recipients to pay the same in terms of sub-section (3)(a) of section 3 of the Act, resultantly burdening the appellant to pay the tax. Any other interpretation will violate sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Finance Act, 2016, and the law laid down by the Apex Court cited supra.

15.     In view of the above deliberation, the answer to question No. (i) is negative, the provisions of sub-section (4A) of section 11 inserted through Finance Act, 2016 would not apply retrospectively for the tax periods prior to tax period June, 2016.

16.     To answer the second question as to whether the provision of sub-section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was relevant and the case of the appellant falls under the said provision? We have to glance at the provisions of sub-sections (2) of section 11, in juxtaposition with sub-section (4A) of section 11 of the Act, as reproduced above. In sub-section (2) of section 11 give the mandates that where a person has not paid the tax due on supplies made by him or has made a short payment on supplies or claimed input tax credit or refund which is not admissible under this Act. The Officer of Inland Revenue shall after a notice to show cause to such person, made an order for assessment of tax actually payable by that person. Whereas sub-section (4A) of section 11 of the Act provides that where a person who is required to withhold sales tax under the provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder fails to withholds the same or fails to deposit the same shall be charged to tax after issuance of show cause notice, determine the amount in default. In the instant case, undisputedly, there is no allegation on the part of the department that the Appellant had not paid the tax due on its supplies or had made a short payment on its supplies or had claimed input credit or refund which was not admissible to them under the Act. Rather the Appellant did not deduct/withhold the sales tax as per rule 2 of Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007 while making payments to the recipients. We,​ ​therefore,​ ​have​ ​no​ ​two​ ​opinions ​ ​that the appellant’s case is​ ​not​ ​covered​ ​in sub-section (2) of section 11 of​ ​the Act. The​ ​legislature itself​ ​while​ ​enacting​ ​the​ ​latest provision of sub-section (4A) inserted through Finance Act, 2016 in section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990,​ ​was​ ​conscious​ ​of​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that earlier the default of withholding tax of a person is not covered in the sub-section (2) of section 11 ibid.​ ​While inserting sub-section (4A) in section 11 of the Act the withholding default of the person was included therein. This subsequent​ ​inclusion​ ​​by​ ​a positive​ ​act​ ​of legislation is​ ​​conclusive​ ​proof​ ​of​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​the​ ​same​ ​was earlier not included in the provisions of section 11 of the Act. ​Consequently,​ ​we​ ​hold​ ​that​ ​under​ ​sub-section (2)​ ​of section 11 of the Act,​ ​the default of withholding tax by the Appellant is not covered in​ ​the said sub-section and the orders passed by the Assessing Officer are illegal, void ab-initio, and without jurisdiction. It is settled law that amendments are made in the statute to bring a change in the law. Reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan titled as Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Companies Zone-II, Lahore Vs M/s Lahore Cantt Cooperative Housing Society, Lahore and 7 others (2009 PTD 799). In the said judgment it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the societies are not covered by the definition of the Company as provided in section 2(16)(b) of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. ​While​ ​enacting​ ​the Income​ ​Tax​ ​Ordinance​ ​of​ ​2001,​ ​such​ ​Cooperative​ ​Societies​ ​were​ ​included​ ​in​ ​the​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​Company. This ​​subsequent​ ​inclusion​ ​of​ ​Cooperative Societies​ ​by​ ​a positive​ ​act​ ​of​ ​legislation​ ​is​ ​ ​ ​conclusive​ ​proof​ ​of​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​the​ ​same​ ​were​ ​excluded​ ​in​ ​the​ ​earlier​ ​enactment.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the answer to this question is also negative.​ ​

 17.    For what has been discussed above, the assumption of jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act by the Assessing Officer is indeed incomplete negation thereto. It is an immutable principle of law that defective assumption/exercise of jurisdiction by the authorities is incurable. Reliance may be placed on Director General Intelligence and Investigation FBR Vs Sher Andaz and 20 Others, (2010 SCMR 1746), Director General Intelligence and Investigation and others Vs M/s AL-Faiz Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others, PTCL 2008 CL 337(S.C) and Collector, Sahiwal and 2 others Vs Muhammad Akhtar, (1971 SCMR 681). In all these judgments it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that: -

i.        Where essential feature of assumption of jurisdiction is contravened or forum exercises power not vested in it, or exceed authority beyond the limit prescribed by law the judgment is rendered Coram non-judice and inoperative (2002 SCMR 122).

ii.        If a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction before the Court, Tribunal, or Authority is not fulfilled, then the entire proceedings which follow become illegal and suffer from want of jurisdiction. Any order passed in continuation of these proceedings in appeal or revisions equally suffer from illegality and are without jurisdiction (2008 SCMR 240)”

CONCLUSION

18.     Keeping in view the provisions of the law as discussed above and the judgments of the Apex Court relating thereto, we, therefore, conclude as under:-

i.        The “wood” is an independent marketable good and therefore, liable to sales tax. It does not come within the ambit of Entry No.10 of Table-II of the 6th Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

ii.        Both the impugned orders passed by the lower authorities are void ab-initio and without jurisdiction.

iii.       Since the basic order passed by the Assessing Officer is void ab-initio, without jurisdiction and this defect is not curable, therefore, we have no alternative except to vacate the impugned orders passed by the lower authorities.

iv.       Accordingly, the appeals of the Appellant are accepted.

19.     This order consists of (14) pages and each page bears my signature.


 

 

Sd/-

Sd/-

(M. M. AKRAM)

JUDICIAL MEMBER

 (MIR BADSHAH KHAN WAZIR)

    ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

 

 

CERTIFICATE U/S 5 OF THE LAW REPORT ACT

 

          This case is fit for reporting as it settles the principles of highlighted above.

 

                                                                               

                                                                                (M. M. AKRAM)

JUDICIAL MEMBER

 

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