Thursday, December 5, 2019

M/s Dewan & CO. Vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi

 

APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, DIVISIONAL BENCH,

ISLAMABAD

STA No.313/IB/2013

MA (AG) No.113/IB/2019

(Tax Periods March, 2001 to April, 2002)

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M/s Dewan & CO. H. No.218 B, Street No.02, judicial Colony, Airport Road, Rawalpindi

 

Appellant

 

VS

 

Commissioner Inland Revenue,  RTO, Rawalpindi

 

Respondent

 

 

Appellant by

 

Mirza Saqib Siddeeq, Advocate

Respondent by

 

Mr. Muhammad Akram, DR

 

Date of hearing

 

05.12.2019

Date of order

 

05.12.2019

ORDER 

M. M. AKRAM (Judicial  Member): The titled sales tax appeal has been filed by the appellant/registered person against Order No.48/2013 dated 09.10.2013 passed by the Learned CIR (Appeals-III), Islamabad for the tax periods March 2001 to April, 2002 on the grounds as set forth in the memo of appeal. Subsequently, the appellant also filed the additional grounds in the titled appeal.

2.       Briefly facts culled out from the record are that the Deputy Director, Intelligence and Investigation, (Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax) Range Office, Rawalpindi that M/s Dewan and Company, Khurram Colony Muslim Town, Sadiqabad, Rawalpindi holding Sales Tax Registration No.07-02-2202-015-19, received taxable beverages of different brands valuing Rs.107,431,807/- from M/s Islamabad Distributors, Islamabad (the Sole Distributor of M/s Haideri Beverages) and then supplied the same to the unregistered retailers/persons during the period from March, 2001 to April, 2002 but failed to pay further tax amounting to Rs.2,647,602/- as required under section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (“the Act”). In the light of the foregoing facts, M/s Dewan and Co have not only violated sections 3(1A), 6, 7, 11, 22, 23, 26, and 34 of the Act but also evaded further tax Rs.2,647,602/- which is recoverable from them under section 36 along with additional tax under sections 34 and penalty u/s 33 of the Act. The assessing officer ultimately passed an order in original No.08/2004 dated 14.04.2004 against the appellant. Felt aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the learned CIR (Appeals-III), Islamabad who vide order dated 09.10.2013 rejected the appeal on the sole ground that the same was hopelessly time-barred. Being aggrieved, the appellant has now come up before this forum and has assailed the impugned order on a number of grounds.

3.       The titled appeal came up for hearing on 05.12.2019. The learned AR vehemently contends that the order in original was not properly served upon the appellant and therefore, after getting the certified copy from Officer Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi on 17.06.2013 preferred the appeal before the learned CIR(A) on 20.06.2013 which is well within the prescribed time. Further submits that the show cause notice in the instant case was issued on 31.07.2003 and the order in original was passed on 14.04.2004 after the expiry of the statutory period of ninety days as prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Thus the order in original is illegal and void ab-initio, the supper structure-based thereon automatically falls to the ground. To support his contention, the learned AR relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan titled as Collector of Sales Tax Vs Super Asia Muhammad Din (2017 PTD 1756). The learned AR further contends that the basic order being void ab-initio having been passed after expiry of ninety days, therefore, the limitation does not attract against void order. Reliance was placed on 2019 SCMR 648. To sum up, his arguments the learned AR lastly contends that the appellant has been treated discriminately as in such like circumstances, the department had accepted the plea of the registered person on the basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Peshawar High Court reported as 2004 PTD 2267 wherein it was held that further tax under section 3(1A) of the Act could not be charged on Third Schedule items. Copy of order in original No.14/2009 dated 03.06.2009 is placed on file.

4.       The learned DR appearing on behalf of the department has contended that the show cause notice issued by the Additional Collector and in consequence thereof passing the order in original is in accordance with law and therefore, there is no infirmity in the impugned order. He, therefore, prays for the rejection of the appeal.

5.       We have heard both the parties, considered the submissions, and also perused the relevant material on record. We have also carefully gone through the judicial pronouncements cited by the learned AR, the question that arises out of the order-in-original is as to whether the Additional Collector (Adjudication) could have passed the order after the expiry of ninety days from the date of issuance of show cause notice as prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990? To answer the said question, we will agree with the learned AR that the time prescribed for making an order in sub-section (3) of section 36 is mandatory and has already been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled as Collector of Sales Tax Vs Super Asia Muhammad Din (2017 PTD 1756) wherein it has been held that:

9. Another aspect of the matter is that when a statute requires that a thing should be done in a particular manner or form, it has to be done in such a manner. But if such provision is a directory, the act done in breach thereof would not be void, even though non-compliance may entail penal consequences. However, non-compliance with a mandatory provision would invalidate such an act. In this context, reference may be made to the case of Rubber House v. Excellisor Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1989 SC 1160). Thus, having held the first proviso to section 36(3) supra to be mandatory, the natural corollary of non-compliance with its terms would be that any order passed beyond the stipulated time period would be invalid.” (Emphasis supplied)

The above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan makes it clear that the first proviso to section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is mandatory. Thus, the assessing officer has to pass an order within the statutory period of ninety days at the relevant time and non-compliance thereof, the order would be invalid. In the instant case, the show cause notice was issued on 31.07.2003 and the order in original was passed on 14.04.2004 after the expiry of ninety days as prescribed at the relevant time in section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Therefore, in the light of the judgment cited supra, the basic order is void. The contention of the learned AR that the limitation does not attract against void ab-initio order is also tenable. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the recent judgment of the Apex Court titled Qazi Munir Ahmed Vs Rawalpindi Medical College and Allied Hospital 2019 SCMR 648. In the said judgment it has been held that: -

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the record. There is no denial of the fact that the appeal filed by the RMC was within time. As such, even if the appeal filed by the Government of Punjab was barred by time, the learned Division Bench had legal basis and lawful justification to entertain and decide both appeals on merits. Even otherwise, the order of the petitioner's appointment was found to be void. Further, in terms of the law laid down by this Court in the judgment reported as Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia (PLD 1958 SC 104), no period of limitation runs against a void order.” (Emphasis supplied)

Further, the careful perusal of the impugned appellate order shows that the learned CIR(A) has only observed that the order in original was issued on 09.06.2004 but there is nothing on record to show that it was properly served on the appellant and therefore, keeping in view the judgment titled as Hussain Foods Multan vs CIT (2003 PTD 1516), it cannot be presumed that the service of order was proper and in accordance with law. Section 56 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 requires that a notice, the order shall be served by sending it by registered post acknowledgment due or courier service to the person for whom it is intended. Further, in a revenue/tax matter, the Hon’ble High Court in the case titled Saleem Akhtar v. CIT Sargodha Zone-A (2002 PTD 1035) has held that:-

“3. In a recent judgment in C.A. No. 323 of 2001 we have examined the issue of limitation in revenue matters. For various reasons stated in that order, this Court expressed the view that unless an assessee was contumacious a prayer for condonation of delay in filing appeals should be considered objectively. Particularly for the reason that by delaying an appeal an assessee does not stand to gain anything nor a delay on his part gives rise to or creates a valuable right in favour of the Revenue. Therefore, we directed that the delay of 43 days in filing of the appeal before the Customs, Excise, and Sales Appellate Tribunal under section 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ought to have been condoned. In the course of that order, we referred to the observations of M.P. Thakkar, J. in re: Controller Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and others (1987) 56 Tax 130 (SC India), Speaking for the Court the Hon'ble Judge observed that:- 

(i)              Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(ii)             Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when the delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

(iii)           “Every day's delay must be explained'' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense, and pragmatic manner.

(iv)           When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

(v)             There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.

(vi)           It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

5. To the above list, we added our own views expressed earlier that in revenue matters prayer for condonation by an assessee/citizen should all the more be considered sympathetically.” 

Therefore, keeping in view of the aforesaid, the issue raised in this appeal has already been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, this Tribunal is bound to follow the judgments supra. In the circumstances, this appeal is accepted on the same terms as the law enunciated and articulated in cited judgments. Consequently, the orders passed by the lower authorities are annulled.

6.       The appeal is disposed of in the manner indicated above. This order consists of (05) pages and each page bears my signature.

 

 

 

 

Sd/-

(M.M. AKRAM)

JUDICIAL MEMBER

Sd/-

 (NADIR MUMTAZ WARRAICH)

ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

 

 

CERTIFICATE U/S 5 OF THE LAW REPORT ACT

                    This case is fit for reporting as it settles the principles highlighted above.

 

                                                                                                              (M. M. AKRAM)

JUDICIAL MEMBER

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