Monday, July 22, 2019

Malik Asghar Ali Prop: M/s Mirjal Petroleum, Attock



APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE ISLAMABAD
DIVISIONAL BENCH

ITA No.1227/IB/2018
(Tax Year-2014)

Malik Asghar Ali Prop: M/s Mirjal Petroleum, Attock.                ………. Appellant
                                                                                      
Versus

CIR, RTO, Rawalpindi.                                                                    ….…….. Respondent

Appellant by                          :           Ch. Nasim Ilyas, ITP
Respondent by                     :           Mr. Zaheer Qureshi, DR
                                                                       
Date of Hearing                    :           22.07.2019
Date of Order                        :          22.07.2019


O R D E R

M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member):        The titled appeal has been filed by the appellant/taxpayer against an order No.1336/2018 dated 19.04.2018 passed by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), Rawalpindi for the Tax Year 2014 on the grounds as set forth in the memo of appeal.

2.       Briefly stated, the relevant facts for the disposal of appeal are that the appellant is an individual and derives income from the sale of petroleum products under the name and style of M/s Mirjal Petroleum, Attock. The appellant filed his income tax return declaring incomes under three heads i.e business income at Rs.212,772/-, property income at Rs.158,840/- and agricultural income at Rs.180,000/-. The return so filed by the appellant by the fiction of law is deemed to be considered as an assessment order under section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance). The case of the appellant was selected for audit under section 214C of the Ordinance by the Federal Board of Revenue. In consequence thereof, the audit proceedings were initiated by the concerned Assessing Officer and reminders notices were also issued from time to time but the appellant did not comply with these notices. Accordingly, there was no option with the Assessing Officer to issue a show-cause notice under section 121(1)(d) of the Ordinance whereby the appellant was confronted with the intention to disallow the purchases under section 174(2) of the Ordinance to the tune of Rs.5,262,126/- against declared at Rs.26,321,628/- and with total disallowances under profit and loss expenses amounting to Rs.222,259/-. On the due date, the taxpayer himself attended the office and contended that during the year under consideration the company blocked his supply due to low sales as such the petroleum products were purchased from various petrol pumps. He was asked to produce proof of purchases and on his request, the case was adjourned to 26-02-2018. On the due date, neither the taxpayer appeared, nor filed any application for adjournment. Since the taxpayer has failed to file any documents in support of his version, the Assessing Officer ultimately framed the best judgment assessment in the light of the provisions of section 121(1)(d)  read with section 177(10) of the Ordinance vide order dated 28.02.2018. The appellant being aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the learned CIR(A) who vide order No.1336/2018 dated 19.04.2018 partially accepted the appeal of the appellant by reducing the purchases up to 10% of the claim and confirmed the add-backs under the head P & L expenses. Now the appellant has assailed the said order before this Tribunal on a number of grounds. 

3.       The learned AR on behalf of the taxpayer assailed the orders of the authorities below as contrary to law and facts of the case. The learned AR vehemently contended that no doubt, non-production of books of accounts empowers the Assessing Officer to proceed for making best judgment assessment on the basis of available information or material. He stressed upon that the expression “based on any available information or material” used in section 121(1)(d) of the Ordinance has been momentous as no such restriction existed or was imposed upon the Assessing Officer under section 63 of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. He submits that the Assessing Officer while making the best judgment assessment has failed to establish or bring any available information or material on the record made a lump-sum addition amounting to Rs.52,62,126/- and Rs.222,259/- under the head purchases and P & L expenses respectively. Therefore, both the additions are arbitrary and not sustainable under the law. He further contended that even otherwise the addition made on account of purchases is neither deduction nor expenditure and as such does not come within the ambit of section 174(2) of the Ordinance. He pointed out that purchases were made for the purpose of business activity and as such do not fall within the ambit of expression “Deduction” or “Expenditure”. He explained that under the provisions of section 35 of the Ordinance as well as the general principle of accountancy, purchases are part of “Stock in Trade” which cannot be termed as “Deduction” or “Expenditure” by any stretch of law and practice. The expression “Stock in Trade” has been defined in section 35 and inter alia the purchases are the part thereof. To sum up, his arguments on this issue, the learned AR argued that purchases are by no means a part of deduction or expenditure and therefore, cannot be disallowed under section 174(2) of the Ordinance. To substantiate his version, the learned AR placed reliance on the judgments reported as 2016 SLD 141, ITA NO.1951/LB/2014, and ITA NO.468/KB/2010.

4.        On the contrary, the learned DR on behalf of the Revenue supported the orders passed by the authorities below and submitted before us that the appellant did not provide any record at the assessment stage therefore, the additions made by the learned DCIR and confirmed by the learned CIR (A) are in accordance with law and prays for rejection of the appeal of the appellant.

5.       We have heard the arguments put forth by the learned representative of both sides and have carefully gone through the available record. After due consideration, we find that the submissions made by the learned AR carry substantial weight. The perusal of an ex-parte assessment order clearly suggests that the same has been passed in a slip-shod manner. The Assessing Officer has not made any proper base for assessment as required under the provisions of section 121(1)(d). The Assessing Officer is required to base the order on available information or material evidence which prima facie is missing while passing the order of exorbitant tax demand. This is a clear violation of Article 10A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. After insertion of Article 10A in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, “fair trial” and “due process” are fundamental rights of every citizen for determination of his civil rights and obligations. Before passing the best judgment assessment, it is a condition precedent to confront the taxpayer with the available information or material evidence and be given an opportunity of being heard. Reliance may be placed in a recent judgment Sarfraz Saleem vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2014 SC 232) wherein it has been held that: -

"4……every person, for determination of his civil rights and obligations or in any criminal charge against him shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process." 

          In another case Babar Hussain Shah and another vs. Mujeeb Ahmed Khan and another(2012 SCMR 1235), the Hon'ble Court has highlighted the import of Article 10A in the words;             

"11... concept of fair trial and due process has always been the golden principles of administration of justice but after incorporation of Article 10-A in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 vide 18th Amendment, it has become more important that due process should be adopted for conducting a fair trial and order passed in violation of due process might be considered to be void.." 

The Assessing Officer under section 121(1)(d) did possess discretion of passing of an ex-parte order with his best judgment assessment on the basis of available information or material. The Hon'ble Supreme Court graciously laid down principles governing the exercise of the discretion in many cases like Amanullah Khan and others Versus The Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others (PLD) 1990 SC 1092), Government of NWFP through Secretary and 3 others Versus Mejee Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) LTD. Mardan and others (1996 SCMR 1804) and Director Food NWFP v. Madina Flour and General Mills (PLD 2001 SC1) by holding that discretionary decision has to be made according to rational reasons which mean findings of primary facts, based on good evidence and that wherever wide-worded powers conferring the discretion exists, there remains always the need to structure the discretion which means regularizing of the so created discretion by organizing it, requiring the exercising authority to give reasons, so that decision may achieve the high quality of justice. The seven principles laid down by those judgments, for structuring discretion are, open plans, open policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons, open precedents, and fair informal procedure. The order impugned it tested on the touchstone given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it falls to the ground, as none of those has been followed by the Assessing Officer. The ex-parte order clearly shows that the Assessing Officer has made addition on account of purchases without considering the fact that in the sale of petroleum products the margin of commission is ranging between 2% to 3% whereas after making bald addition on account of purchases, the said margin of profit is enhanced to 23% which by any stretch of the imagination is impossible in this line of business. This clearly shows that the Assessing Officer has made the addition without considering the facts of the case. The impugned appellate order, as well as assessment order, are totally without any base and material and against the provisions of Section 121(1)(d) of the Ordinance and the law laid down by the Apex Court, are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Assessing Officer for de-novo consideration with the directions to provide the proper opportunity of being heard to the appellant and to pass a proper and speaking order after conducting proper inquiries and to bring solid material evidence and information on record.

6.       The appeal of the appellant is allowed in the manner as stated above.

7.       This order consists of (05) pages and each page bears my signature. 

 

Sd/-

    (M. M. AKRAM)

JUDICIAL MEMBER

Sd/-

 (NADIR MUMTAZ WARRAICH)

    ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

  

CERTIFICATE U/S 5 OF THE LAW REPORT ACT 

                    This case is fit for reporting as it settles the principles highlighted above.

 

 

 

(M. M. AKRAM)

JUDICIAL MEMBER

 

 

  

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